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Mobility in Europe since the Eastern enlargement: 









The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the most recent trends in labour 
mobility after the two waves of Eastern enlargement, within the context of labour 
market developments mainly in the newly joined Central and Eastern European 
Member States. The article focuses on the question of how the current economic 
and financial crisis impacted on these trends, whether a slowdown of labour 
outflow  from  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  Member  States  could  be 
detected as a consequence. From a policy point of view, it is important to assess 
the consequences of the new mobility trends not only in the receiving countries, 
but also in the sending ones, as well as the individuals and families affected. 
Due  to  the  short  time  which  passed  since  the  enlargement,  there  is  limited 
empirical evidence, but the paper makes an attempt to highlight those issues in 
this regard, which could have important policy implications in the future. The 
analysis  is  based  partly  on  previous  research,  partly  on  the  most  recent 
empirical data. 
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As is well known, even before Eastern enlargement, keen interest was 
shown by policy-makers both at Member States and European level in the extent 
of potential labour outflow from the would-be members. As a result, extensive 
research was conducted on the topic, exploring also the impacts the potential 
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number of mobile workers could have, on economies of the EU15 countries... 
  The best known and largest research (commissioned by European policy-
makers,  i.e.  the  European  Commission,  (see:  Boeri  and  Brücker,  2001)) 
concluded  that  large  outflow  could  not  be  expected.    Despite  this,  a  7-year 
transition period was introduced, similarly to all previous enlargements (with the 
exception of only one, when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 
1995). Nonetheless, some countries had already opened their labour markets at 
the time of the accession of the 8 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. on 
May 1, 2004. These were the UK, Ireland and Sweden (especially the former 
two  are  well  known  for  their  deregulated  labour  markets).  It  is  remarkable, 
however, that neither Ireland, nor the UK opened their labour markets during the 
second wave of enlargement, i.e. in 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania joined 
the EU. It is true that both these countries do have a relatively high migration 
potential: from Bulgaria, quite recently, but well before the enlargement, large 
emigration waves could be observed, whereas in the case of Romania, apart 
from  its  low  GDP-level  (even  compared  to  countries  of  the  first  wave  of 
enlargement),  the  size  of  its  population  is  large.  Apart  from  Sweden,  only 
Finland  (which lifted  its restrictions  after  2004)  kept  its  labour  market  open 
towards these two new East-European members. (F￳ti, 2009)  
The main objective of this paper is to give an overview of the most recent 
trends in labour mobility after the two waves of Eastern enlargement, within the 
context of labour market developments mainly in the newly joined Central and 
Eastern European Member States. The article focuses on the question of how the 
current economic and financial crisis impacted on these trends, and whether a 
slowdown of labour outflow from the Central and Eastern European Member 
States could be detected as a consequence. Our assumption is that the impact 
was significant and visible in those host countries where the inflow had been 
high before the crisis. This has, however, manifested itself rather in lower net 
inflow than in massive return of mobile workers to their home countries. One of 
the reasons could be that the financial and economic downturn severely hit also 
the economies of the sending countries (the only exception is Poland - here the 
return seemed to be higher, although not on a massive scale, either, the wage 
differentials being very large).   
The structure of the paper is as follows: first, it raises some relevant issues 
and recent research findings are touched. In the second section, labour market 
developments are to be presented both at the EU-level and in the countries most 
affected by increased mobility. The first part of the third section is concerned 
with the most recent mobility trends with special regard to possible impacts of 
the current financial and economic crisis, whereas the second part focuses on 
those sectors and occupations which are most affected by the increased mobility. 
In the concluding section, the paper is concerned with possible future trends 
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2. Some questions and findings from recent research 
Both from a theoretical and practical point of view it is relevant to ask 
how  the  recent  financial  and  economic  crisis  affected  those  mobility  trends 
which  have  developed  since  the  two  waves  of  Eastern  enlargement.  From  a 
theoretical  perspective,  one  could  assume  that  in  the  wake  of  dismantling 
administrative barriers, free allocation of labour could alleviate adverse effects 
of the crisis on the labour market. The data, however, do not seem to support the 
assumption. An obvious explanation for this could be that there are still some 
administrative restrictions in place, long-term experiences are lacking both in 
terms  of  the  free  labour  flow  and  its  consequences,  and  finally,  the  crisis 
severely  hit  practically  all  Member  States.  In  addition,  other  factors    than 
mobility had large influence (since individual migration decisions are based on 
complex considerations).  
In  practical  terms,  even  some  controversial  effects  seem  to  emerge, 
especially  in  the  sending  countries:  as  a  consequence  of  large  outflow  from 
certain occupations, mainly in the care and health sectors, concerns over labour 
shortages  are  being  increasingly  raised  in  the  Central  and  East-European 
Member States. Moreover, it may well be that the consequences of the crisis 
accelerate this process since the ensuing budgetary restrictions affect precisely 
this  sector  to  a  considerable  extent.  Amidst  large  restructuring,  which  goes 
together with layoffs and wage cuts (also in public services), the outflow will be 
accelerating. Although budgetary cuts are being experienced throughout the EU, 
the adjustments could be smoother (at least in these two sectors) in the receiving 
countries (EU15) than in the newly joined Central and East-European members
1. 
At the same time, due to job opportunities for citizens of the recently joined 
members, in a wider European space, newly emerging tensions on their labour 
market could be eased. Free cross-country mobility is, however, not a panacea 
since, in reality, job opportunities are available for certain occupations and 
socio-economic groups only. No doubt, mostly young people could avail of 
them. Even in their case, however, there are certain limits  of unemployment 
being reduced in this way. Not only does their propensity for migration depend 
on  many  factors  (such  as  family  circumstances,  knowledge  of  languages 
willingness to invest in learning them, etc.), demand is lacking in many skilled 
                                                 
1 According to the two waves of enlargement (the first on 1st of May 2004, the second 
on 1st of January 2007, when data are available the paper distinguishes between those 
which joined during the first wave, and will be called hereinafter as EU10 (although, as 
is well known, out of these only 8 are from Central and Eastern Europe, and the two, 
Cyprus and Malta do not belong to this region, due to short size of the latter two, this 
will  not  disturb  the  general  trends).  Bulgaria  and  Romania  which  joined  during  the 
second wave, will be labelled as EU2.  96  Kl￡ra FÓTI 
 
or unskilled jobs, a situation, exacerbated by the crisis in the (potential) host 
countries.  
Therefore,  even  if  the  crisis  impacted  on  recent  mobility  trends  to  a 
significant extent (as to be shown in the paper); it is difficult to explore how 
these trends influenced labour markets in individual Member States. The impacts 
are obviously different, depending primarily on the extent of outflow from and 
inflow to the given country, respectively. It is clear, however, that there is a 
tendency towards some labour market adjustment at the European level, pointing 
to an emerging European labour market.  
A  comprehensive  overview  of  recent  research  findings  is  given  by 
Holland  et al.  (2011),  dealing  with the  effects  of  post-accession  mobility  on 
labour markets in individual countries (both host and sending countries) as well 
as the impacts of the crisis. As regards the former, it was concluded that “there 
has been no, a small negative, or even a small positive labour market effect in 
the destination countries while the long run impact  is believed to be very small 
or none.” (Holland et al., 2011. p. 30.) Less research was concerned with the 
effects on labour markets of the sending countries. Two main tendencies were 
identified: potential loss of specialised workers and lower unemployment. As far 
as the demographic effects are concerned, which are particularly relevant not 
only in the long-run, but also in the medium- and short-term, it was suggested 
that due to the younger age profile of the migrants, “the host countries benefit 
from  the  demographic  effect,  the  sending  countries  will  experience  negative 
effects from higher old age dependency rates. The EU-8 and EU2 exhibit low 
fertility levels and a net outflow of people in their working age will aggravate 
the  pension  situation  in  these  countries”  (ibid).    In  some  sending  countries, 
where  the  outflow  was  significant,  the  consequences  could  be  particularly 
severe. For example, in Latvia the government already has to face the challenge 
“to ensure there are enough working-age people to fund the pension system” 
(Buckley, 2011).    
 
3. Recent labour market developments, based on some relevant indicators 
The impact of the crisis becomes clear even for the first sight, when the 
key indicators at the EU-level are looked at (see Table 1). It is interesting to see 
however, that the employment rate between 2007 and 2010 declined less in the 
Central  and  East-European  EU-Members  than  in  the  EU15  (0.1  percentage 
points, 1.6 percentage points, respectively). As regards the unemployment rate, it 
increased by less percentage points in the former than in the latter group (from 
7.8%  to  10.0%  and  from  7.1  to  9.6,  i.e.  by  2.2  and  2.5  percentage  points, 
respectively).  
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Table 1. Employment and unemployment rates since the enlargement in 
EU27, EU15 and EU12 (2004-2010) 
Employment rate 
EU and Member States-Groups  2004  2007  2009  2010 
EU-27   62.8  65.4  64.6  64.2 
EU-15  64.6  66.9  65.9  65.4 
EU-12 (NMS)  56.4  59.9  60.0  60.0 
Unemployment rate 
 
EU and Member States Groups  2004 
 
2007  2009  2010 
EU-27   9.3  7.2  9.0  9.7 
EU-15  8.3  7.1  9.1  9.6 
EU-12 (NMS)  13.0  7.8  8.6  10.0 
Source: Eurostat, ELFS 
Based just on these indicators, one could conclude that the crisis has not 
hit the recently joined EU-members as severely as it has the “old” ones. It has to 
be clearly seen, however, that the “new” Member States started from a very low 
level:  even  on  the  average,  their  employment  rate  stood  well  below  60%, 
whereas in EU15, even in less developed countries this level was reached (for 
example,  in  Greece,  see  table  2.).  In  addition,  Table  2.  (indicating  the 
employment rate in selected individual Member States) also shows that, in some 
countries of the newly joined Central and European region, the rate stood at 
below 56% (for example in Poland).  
Table 2. Employment rate in selected EU-Member States % (2005-2010) 
Selected countries  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Bulgaria  55.8  58.6  61.7  64.0  62.6  59.7 
Czech Republic  64.8  65.3  66.1  66.6  65.4  65.0 
Germany   66.0  67.5  69.4  70.7  70.9  71.1
i 
Estonia  64.4  68.1  69.4  69.8  63.5  61.0 
Ireland  67.6  68.7  69.2  67.6  61.8  60.0 
Greece  60.1  61.0  61.4  61.9  61.2  59.6 
Spain  63.3  64.8  65.6  64.3  59.8  58.6 
France  63.7  63.7  64.3  64.9  64.1  64.0 
Italy  57.6  58.4  58.7  58.7  57.5  56.9 
Latvia  63.3  66.3  68.3  68.6  60.9  59.3 
Lithuania  62.6  63.6  64.9  64.3  60.1  57.8 
Hungary  56.9  57.3  57.3  56.7  55.4  55.4 
Austria  68.6  70.2  71.4  72.1  71.6  71.7 
Poland  52.8  54.5  57.0  59.2  59.3  59.3 
Romania  57.6  58.8  58.8  59.0  58.6  58.8 
Slovakia  57.7  59.4  60.7  62.3  60.2  58.8 
United Kingdom  71.7  71.6  71.5  71.5  69.9  69.5 
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If  unemployment  is  also  looked  at  more  thoroughly,  i.e.  by  individual 
countries, it becomes also clear that there is no difference between the two parts 
of the EU in how severely the crisis hit their labour markets: in some EU15 
countries, the unemployment rate more than doubled (in Spain), or even tripled 
(in  Ireland)  and,  at  the  same  time,  in  some  Central  and  Eastern  European 
members,  the  rate  also  more  than  tripled  (Latvia),  and  in  Lithuania  it  even 
increased by four times, i.e. from 4.4% in 2007 to 18% in 2010).  The reason 
why the overall (average) picture of the latter group seems more favourable is 
that in the biggest country of the region, which has a high weight,  in Poland, 
unemployment  even  decreased,  and  in  the  other  big  country,  in  Romania,  it 
remained more or less at the same level (although in the biggest country of the 
EU15, Germany the rate also declined,  this happened to a lesser extent than in 
Poland, and other large countries’ worse performance offset Germany’s more 
favourable labour market situation). 
Table 3. Unemployment rates in selected EU Member States (%) 2005-2010 
Selected Member States  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Spain  9.2  8.6  8.3  11.4  18.1  20.2 
Latvia  9.0  7.0  6.1  7.7  17.5  19.0 
Lithuania  8.4  5.7  4.4  5.9  13.9  18.0 
Estonia  8.1  6.0  4.8  5.6  14.1  17.3 
Slovakia  16.3  13.4  11.2  9.5  12.1  14.4 
Ireland  4.4  4.5  4.6  6.1  12.0  13.7 
Hungary  7.2  7.5  7.4  7.9  10.1  11.2 
Bulgaria  10.2  9.0  6.9  5.7  6.9  10.3 
Poland  18.0  14.0  9.7  7.2  8.3  9.7 
Italy  7.8  6.9  6.2  6.8  7.9  8.5 
United Kingdom  4.8  5.4  5.4  5.7  7.7  7.9 
Romania  7.5  7.6  6.8  6.1  7.2  7.6 
Germany   11.2  10.3  8.7  7.6  7.8  7.2 
Source: Eurostat, ELFS 
 
The  fact  that  labour  markets  of  the  Central  and  East-European  region 
performed at a lower level before the crisis, is also confirmed by the activity 
rate: the share of the economically active population (share of employed persons 
plus unemployed people in working age, i.e. 15-64 years of age, population) is 
generally lower in the region than in EU15. As can be seen from Table 4, there 
are large  differences  in the  level  of  economic  activity  across  countries.  It  is 
remarkable  that  in  Italy,  which  is  a  major  receiving  country  (of  mainly 
Romanian nationals), the activity rate is very low and since the crisis outburst it 
has become even lower than that in Hungary, which had the lowest share of 
economically active population. 
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Table 4. Activity rate in EU27, EU15 and selected Member States (%) 
2005-2010 
EU27, EU15, and selected Member States  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
European Union (27 countries)  69.8  70.3  70.5  70.9  71.0  71.0 
European Union (15 countries)  71.2  71.8  72.0  72.5  72.5  72.4 
EU12 (NMS)  64.8  65.0  64.9  65.3  65.7  66.2 
Bulgaria  62.1  64.5  66.3  67.8  67.2  66.5 
Czech Republic  70.4  70.3  69.9  69.7  70.1  70.2 
Germany   74.3  75.3  76.0  76.5  76.9  76.6 
Estonia  70.1  72.4  72.9  74.0  74.0  73.8 
Ireland  70.8  71.9  72.5  72.0  70.2  69.5 
Spain  69.7  70.8  71.6  72.6  73.0  73.4 
Italy  62.5  62.7  62.5  63.0  62.4  62.2 
Latvia  69.6  71.3  72.8  74.4  73.9  73.2 
Lithuania  68.4  67.4  67.9  68.4  69.8  70.5 
Hungary  61.3  62.0  61.9  61.5  61.6  62.4 
Austria  72.4  73.7  74.7  75.0  75.3  75.1 
Poland  64.4  63.4  63.2  63.8  64.7  65.6 
Romania  62.3  63.6  63.0  62.9  63.1  63.6 
Slovenia  70.7  70.9  71.3  71.8  71.8  71.5 
Slovakia  68.9  68.6  68.3  68.8  68.4  68.7 
United Kingdom  75.4  75.7  75.5  75.8  75.7  75.5 
Source: Eurostat, ELFS 
 
As can be seen from Table 4., even after the crisis, the average activity rate 
remained on the same level (in EU15 it slightly decreased, whereas in EU12 it 
even increased). The aggregate figures both at EU15 and EU12 levels mask 
large cross-country differences. In the case of the Central and Eastern European 
Member States, the activity rates ranged from 62.4% (Hungary, as mentioned 
above), to 73.8% (Estonia).   
 
4. Trends and key features of recent mobility from the Central and East-
European Member States, with special regard to the impact of the crisis 
4.1. The extent of the recent inflow 
As the inflow primarily affected the working age population, in order to 
get a first and overall picture of the extent, it is worth to have a look at the share 
of foreign citizens from other Member States in the working age population of 
the destination countries in the total of the EU as well as to the countries of the 
main receiving country group - the EU15. As can be seen  in Table 5., the share 
of  citizens  from  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  members  doubled:  it 
increased from 0.7% to 1.5%. As a result, the mobility from the Eastern part of 
the EU almost reached the level of mobility between the “old” members, i.e. the 100  Kl￡ra FÓTI 
 
EU15, and the reason why it has not come very close to it was that, in the 
meantime, the intra-EU15 mobility also increased, though it slightly stood at 
1.7% in 2005 and grew to 1.9 %  in both 2009 and 2010.   
Table 5. Share of citizens from other EU members in the total working age 
population of the destination countries of all the EU and of the EU15 (15-64 
years, %) 
EU-Member 
States (group) of 
destination 



















  2005  2009  2010 
EU-27 countries  1.9  1.4  0.6  2.6  1.5  1.1  2.8  1.6  1.3 
EU-15 countries  2.4  1.7  0.7  3.2  1.9  1.4  3.5  1.9  1.5 
Source: Eurostat ELFS 
 
Therefore,  it  is  without  doubt  that  since  the  two  waves  of  Eastern 
enlargement, the intra-EU mobility has increased substantially, mainly due to the 
inflow of the citizens from the Central and East-European members. If, however, 
the share of all the foreigners are taken into account, the dominance of third 
country nationals becomes clear in the EU15, and, as a result, in the EU as a 
whole (see Table 6.).  
Table  6.  Foreign  nationals  in  the  EU  population  of  working  age  (15-64 
years) 
EU27  and  EU-
country-  groups  as 
destinations  2000  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
EU-27   4.2  4.9  5.7  6.1  6.5  7.0  7.2  7.3 
EU-15  5.3  6.1  7.1  7.6  8.2  8.6  8.9  9.0 
EU-12   0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  1.0  1.1  1.1 
Source: Eurostat ELFS 
 
Although the role of the EU-12 as destination is negligible, it is interesting 
to see the increasing trend in this since the enlargement (the share of the foreign 
working age population grew from 0.6% in 2005 to 1.1%, so this share has 
almost also doubled.)   
There is one host country of the EU15, which is a clear exception to the 
rule of the dominance of third country migrants: Ireland. From 2006, the number 
of third country residents living here has become lower than that of citizens from 
the  EU-10  countries.  In  fact,  between  2005  and  2008,  the  working-age 
population arriving from these EU Member States contributed to the growth of 
Ireland’s working-age population of 2008 by 4.4%, whereas the third country 
nationals by 2.2% and even those of the EU-15 by 2.0% (despite the traditionally MOBILITY IN EUROPE SINCE THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT   101 
 
and geographically close connections with the UK, i.e. many of those citizens 
come  from  Northern  Ireland).  In  all  other  major  host  countries,  the  mobile 
citizens from EU15 exceed those coming from EU-10 (their number is close to 
citizens from EU15 only in Italy, where together with the EU-2 citizens, they 
even exceed the number arriving from the other EU15 countries.) 
Despite the general dominance of third country nationals in EU15 (which 
is the result of long-term developments over many decades), the large inflow 
from the Central and Eastern European members becomes evident from absolute 
numbers,  focusing  on  inflow  to  the  key  host  countries  (see  Table  7).    It  is 
interesting to see that, despite the remaining restrictions, the number of residents 
increased both in Austria and in Germany (although some authors argue that the 
increase is due to “regularisation” of those illegal EU-10 and EU-2 migrants 
who had already stayed there before the accession – this may have been the case 
initially, but cannot explain later increases, which, especially in the case of EU 
citizens, continued even despite the crisis, towards the end of the first decade of 
the  new  Millennium).  It  is  understandable,  however,  that  the  growth  of  the 
inflow of EU-10 mobile citizens was much more pronounced in the UK and 
Ireland, i.e. in those EU countries which had already opened their labour markets 
in 2004 during the entry of the EU-10 countries (i.e. during the first wave of 
accession). As can be seen, their numbers doubled in the case of these two host 
countries between 2005 and 2007.  The impact of the crisis, however, is very 
clear: in Ireland, which is one of the countries, the hardest hit by the economic 
recession (well reflected in key macro-level labour market indicators - see them 
above),  the  number  of  residents  declined  between  2008  and  2010  from  211 
thousand to 180. (This fall is even more sharply reflected in the case of workers, 
or even of their potential number: as can be seen from the table in the Annex, the 
number of applicants for the Personal Public Service Number which is required 
to  work  in  Ireland  strongly  declined:  for  example,  the  number  of  Polish 
applicants fell from 42,553 to 13,794 between 2008 and 2009, and it declined 
further  in  2010.)  Despite  this  decline,  however,  the  citizens  of  the  EU-10 
remained the largest group of foreign nationals living in Ireland
2. At the same 
time, it has to be noted that, not surprising ly, the crisis adversely affected job 
opportunities not only for the native population, but also for the mobile workers 
in Ireland: the employment rate of the EU10 citizens fell by 18.1% during the 
period between 2007 and 2009, which seems to be the largest decline, compared 
                                                 
2 Between 2006 and 2010 share of citizens from the EU-10 in the total population was 
the following: 3.7% (2006), 4.8% (2007), 4.1% (2009), and 4.0% (2010). Share of EU-
15 citizens for the same years: 3.6 %, 3.6%, 3.8%, 3.3%, 2.7%. Share of third country 
nationals in the total population during the same period stood at: 3.1%, 3.3%, 3.4%, 
3.1%, and 2.8%, respectively. (Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, Eurostat population statistics, 
national data sources, DG Employment estimates - see notes to Table 7). 102  Kl￡ra FÓTI 
 
to  other  groups  of  mobile  workers  (EU2)  or  migrants  (non  EU27)  in  other 
European host countries. 
Table  7.  Number  of  foreign  residents  from  the  recently  joined  Member 
States  in  key  host  countries,  by  EU10  and  EU2  citizens,  2005-2010 
(Thousand) 
 
Source: Eurostat, ELFS, Eurostat population statistics, national data sources, DG 
Employment estimates (data extracted from A2 table in Annex to the EC Report, 
2011) 
Notes: …: too small, or not reliable 
*: Eurostat population statistics;  
**2005: CSO-estimates, 2006-2010: EU LFS quarterly data, 4
th quarter 
***EU LFS quarterly data, 4
th quarter 
 
As  a  consequence  of  the  crisis,  the  gap  between  labour  market 
performances of the UK and Ireland clearly widened to a considerable extent: as 
can be seen from Table 3, between 2008 and 2009, the unemployment rate in 
Ireland doubled, whereas in the UK, although it also increased, this occurred to a 
lesser extent. (Employment as well as the activity rates, of course, reflects also 
this; they declined in Ireland by much more than in the UK.) This was obviously 
reflected in how the numbers of mobile citizens developed: in the UK, after a 
slight decrease, the number of residents increased again (from 728 thousand in 
2008, it declined to 720 thousand in 2009 but rose again to 945 thousand in 
2010). 
The situation is different with the EU-2, which is obviously linked to their 
later entry. The crisis, however, does not seem to have an effect on their inflow 
to their major destination countries (although it may well be that without the 
crisis,  their  number  would  be  even  higher).  As  regards  the  increase  in  their 
number in Spain in 2009 and 2010, however, this is understandable in view of 
the fact that Spain granted free access to Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in 
January  2009  (which,  as  is  known,  was  withdrawn  from  Romanians,  due  to 
serious labour market disturbances in Spain). At the first sight, however, it is not 
easy  to  explain  why  the  number  of  EU-2  residents  increased  in  Italy  which 
applied restrictions, even if with simplifications (and it still does).  This question MOBILITY IN EUROPE SINCE THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT   103 
 
is all the more relevant since, as can be seen from Tables 2., 3., and 4., the 
labour  markets  in  both  Spain  and  Italy  were  severely  hit  by  the  recession 
(employment rate declined and although unemployment rate increased in Spain 
by much higher percentage points than in Italy, the activity rate is one of the 
lowest in the EU27). There are two plausible explanations for this: one is that the 
increase reflects “regularisation” of illegal Bulgarian and Romanian migrants 
having already stayed in these countries before the accession (similarly to the 
case of the EU-10 citizens in Germany and Austria). The other is that the inflow, 
especially  in  Italy,  is  highly  demand-driven,  i.e.  there  are  some  sectors  and 
occupations  which  are  characterised  by  significant  labour  shortages,  and 
therefore the EU-2 citizens are in high demand in certain specific segments of 
the labour market (a topic which is touched on in the next subsection). This 
assumption  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that    the  employment  rate  of  the  EU2 
workers declined to a lower extent than in Spain, as a consequence of the crisis, 
i.e.  during  the  period  of  2007-2009:    in  Italy,  it  decreased  by  3.1%,  only, 
whereas  in  Spain  by  14.2%  (Eurostat,  Labour  Force  Survey,  in:  European 
Commission, 2010). 
 
4.2. Key features of recent mobility from the Central and Eastern European 
Member States: some educational, sectorial and occupational patterns 
The figures of educational attainment of mobile citizens from EU2 to Italy 
as  well  as  the  occupational  and  sectorial  pattern  seem  to  confirm  the  above 
mentioned assumption. The  share of those prime age (25-49 years) persons, 
who had upper secondary education attainment, was far higher in 2009 than that 
of the population born in the country, being 62.4%, as against 44.7% (Source: 
Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, quoted in: European Commission, 2010). This 
means that the majority of mobile citizens in this age group already had specific 
skills to offer when they arrived in the country. In addition, the share of those 
who were employed in intermediate level occupations was also high in 2010, 
reaching 54% (of the EU2 mobile workers of 15-64 of age). At the same time, 
the share of the EU2 mobile citizens with higher educational attainment was by 
far the lowest in Italy
3, and the proportion of those employed in high-skilled jobs 
was also negligible (4%). These, together with the sectorial pattern, showing that 
the highest share of EU2 workers (27%)
4  can  be  found  in  “Other  services, 
private  households,  etc.”,  point  to  the  same  direction:  namely  that  the  EU2 
citizens (mainly Romanians who constitute the majority) are primarily occupied 
in a specific “niche” of the labour market, where there was high, unmet demand 
before  (24%  was  employed  in  construction,  18%  in  trade,  transport  and 
communication, 14% in manufacturing, etc.).    
                                                 
3 8.4% only, in 2009 (of the 25-49 years of population of EU2 mobile citizens).   
4 The figure refers to the year 2010. 104  Kl￡ra FÓTI 
 
Generally,  most  mobile  citizens  from  Central  and  Easter-European 
Member States have upper secondary education (similarly to the EU2 citizens in 
Italy). Although in some destination countries, the educational attainment of the 
Central  and  Eastern  mobile  citizens  seems  high  (for  example,  according  to 
Eurostat data of the Labour Force Survey, in Austria, the share of the EU10 
citizens with tertiary education was higher in both 2008 and 2009 than that of 
the  population  born  in  the  country),  the  general  “rule”  is  that  the  upper 
secondary attainment dominate the scene, and the share of mobile citizens with 
basic  education  is  lower  than  that  of  the  population  born  in  the  destination 
country (interestingly, the exception is again Austria, where the share of the EU2 
mobile citizens with basic education was slightly higher 12.6% as against 11.4% 
in 2009, and clearly higher in 2010 when the respective figures were 18.3%  and 
10.9%)
5. 
If the sectorial pattern in general is examined, it becomes clear from the 
European Labour Force Survey that it is basically characterised by those features 
which are quite typical for migrant workers: the share of manufacturing is high 
among  EU-10  workers  (22.1%),  accommodation  and  food  service  sector 
employs 13.4% of EU10 and 14.2% of EU2 workers, the share of those who 
work in construction is twice as much in the case of EU2 workers as that of 
EU10 workers (21.2% against 10.4%). It is interesting that in   “activities  of 
households as employers”, the share of the EU2 workers is much higher, being 
17.5%  as  against  2.5%  (EU10  workers).  It  is  highly  unlikely  that  this  gap 
reflects the reality. It can rather be assumed that this and construction are those 
two activities where most EU10 workers are employed in Austria and Germany 
but, due to the restrictions still in place in 2010, the numbers cannot be revealed 
(i.e. many workers are employed illegally, and/or as seasonal workers). 
   
5. Conclusions: potential future trends and directions for further research 
The  paper  presented  the  most  recent  trends  in  labour  mobility,  with 
special focus on the consequences of the crisis. As could be seen, the recent 
economic  downturn  most  visibly  affected  the  inflow  of  the  citizens  from 
countries  of  the  first  wave  of  enlargement,  i.e.  those  of  the  EU10,  whereas 
mobility from the EU2 countries continued to increase partly due to the severity 
of effects of the downturn in these sending countries, and partly to the very large 
income  differentials,  and  finally  due  to  the  constant  high  demand  in  those 
                                                 
5 Although, according to the Eurostat LFS data, share of the EU-10 citizens with basic 
education is lower than the population born in Austria, it may well be that share of the 
former is underestimated by the LFS since seasonal workers (for example in agriculture 
or in tourism and catering) cannot be included. This could also provide an explanation 
why these figures show higher share of EU10 citizens with tertiary education than that of 
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specific occupations and sectors where they are largely employed (the current 
figures show that in Italy this seems to be the case).  
As  regards  future  trends,  once  recovery  starts,  a  certain  increase  in 
mobility can be expected, and, by lifting all the remaining restrictions (in 2013), 
the destination countries will be more diversified (as could be clearly seen from 
the paper, this process has already started with the second wave of enlargement). 
As it is well known, there are already a high number of young people from the 
EU12  countries  who  are  doing  their  studies  in  one  of  the  EU15.  As  a 
consequence of this fact and of such schemes, like for example the ERASMUS 
programme, the mobility of young people could even increase (although even 
nowadays they constitute the most important group in intra-EU mobility). This 
could  result  in  changes  in  the  educational,  occupational  and  sectorial 
composition of mobile citizens from Central and Eastern-European members, 
which means that it will show less similarities to the features which characterize 
the typical occupational and sectorial patterns of  migrants’ employment.  
As mentioned, before the enlargement, much concern was raised over the 
possible impacts the increased mobility could have on the labour markets of the 
destination  countries.  On  the  basis  of  the  current  mobility  trends,  however, 
nowadays those concerns, raised in the sending countries, seem more justified - 
increased mobility could result in serious labour shortages in some occupations, 
especially  in  the  health  and  care  sector.  This,  besides  other  demographic 
challenges which all the Member States have to face, could put further pressure 
on the public budgets of these countries. It is without doubt, therefore, that an 
emerging  European  labour  market  could  pose  new  challenges  which  require 
adequate responses. 
Within the context of an emerging European labour market, it has to be 
acknowledged, however, that with final removal of restrictions, young people of 
the  Central  and  Eastern  European  Member  States  could  have  much  wider 
opportunities which could facilitate their school-to-work transition. As a recent 
project
6  concluded, the possible impact of increased mobility could be an 
important topic for further research. The integration of young people into the 
labour market is also high on the agenda at the European policy level since, as a 
consequence of the current crisis, youth unemployment has become very high. 
Related to this topic, the integration of young people into their job abroad could 
also be a relevant research area. Within the context of mobility, this subject is all 
the more relevant since, according to some recent surveys
7, many young people 
who work abroad are overqualified for the job they perform there. 
                                                 
6 A project, launched by the Eurofound on „New mobility trends in Europe”. 
7 One of them, which was conducted in 2008, showed that almost all Romanians (93%) 
with high level of education were overqualified for the job they were doing (European 
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Number of  Central and Eastern  European  applicants to whom Personal 
Public  Service  (PPS)  Numbers*  are  allocated  in  Ireland  by  nationality 
(2000-2010) 
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Other years: quoted in: F￳ti, K., 2009. 
Note :*These numbers are prerequisites for getting a job in Ireland. 
 
 
Country  of 
origin 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Bulgaria  104  98  267  1008  772  277  295 
Czech Republic  3,298  4,505  4,458  3,838  2,762  901  712 
Estonia  1,788  2,011  1,407  648  572  428  207 
Hungary  1,839  3,086  4,330  5,046  4,562  1,794  1,584 
Latvia  6,266  9,328  7,954  4,674  3,727  3,916  3,134 
Lithuania  12,817  18,717  16,039  10,728  6,443  3,768  4,353 
Poland  27,295  64,731  93,787  79,816  42,553  13,794  8,742 
Romania  591  813  3,336  14,525  6,762  2,624  3,002 
Slovakia  5,187  9,258  10,687  8,375  4,994  1,784  1,288 
Slovenia  64  76  101  63  87  40  37 